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Introduction 
Moral responsibility relates to many significant topics in ethics and metaphysics, such 
as the content and scope of moral obligations, the nature of human agency, and the 
structure of human interaction. This article focuses on compatibilist approaches to 
moral responsibility – that is, approaches that see moral responsibility as compatible 
with the causal well-orderedness of the world. This is partly because they have more to 
say about the nature of moral responsibility and the practices associated with it, and also 
because there will be a future bibliography on free will. The article also focuses mainly 
on the debates considered most significant by contemporary analytic philosophers. 
However, it also points to some earlier contributions and to some significant 
contributions from outside those debates. In particular, it is interesting that 
contemporary debates often focus on the agency of the responsible person, without 
attending to the forms of interaction in which that person may participate. However, as 
Peter Strawson pointed out in a seminal essay (see *Responsibility and the Reactive 
Sentiments*), moral responsibility is intimately related to our reactions to one another. 
Should those reactions be understood by reference to features of the person held 
responsible, or by reference to the relationship between persons where some action or 
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outcome is at issue, or even by reference to wider social and political structures? Moral 
responsibility also borders on a number of topics of great practical importance. These 
include responsibility under the law, the responsibilities of groups and organisations, 
accountability within organisations, and how distributive justice and individual 
responsibility are related. Again, this entry focuses largely on individual moral 
responsibility and only mentions a few social and legal discussions of responsibility 
with especial implications for how we think about individual responsibility.  
General Overviews 
A number of recent overviews give useful introductions, but offer different approaches 
to the topic. Duff (1998) and Eshleman (2001) are relatively accessible introductions; 
McKenna (2004) is more demanding and technical; Kutz (2002) is the most 
intellectually penetrating, but is orientated by concerns in law and jurisprudence rather 
than morality. 
Duff, A. (1998) ‘Responsibility,’ Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Craig, 
(Routledge, London, 10 vols.) 
[Useful short outline of the issues. See also the encyclopedia’s entries on: Praise 
and Blame; Determinism and indeterminism; Free will.] 
Eshleman, A. (2001/4) ‘Moral Responsibility,’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
[plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility] 
[A useful short overview that gives some historical background, and locates 
current approaches in the light of Peter Strawson’s influential contribution.] 
McKenna, M. (2004) ‘Compatibilism,’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
[plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism] 
[Lengthy, technical and proficient overview of compatibilist approaches to moral 
responsibility, with a further appendix on the most recent debates.] 
Kutz, C. (2002) ‘Responsibility’ in J. Coleman & S. Schapiro (eds) Oxford Handbook of 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law  
[Oriented toward legal debates. Nonetheless, a significant contribution arguing 
that the relational aspects of responsibility attribution are of critical importance. 
That is, we hold persons responsible within the context of particular relationships 
– personal, organisational or legal – and consider ourselves responsible to 
particular persons or bodies.] 
Anthologies and Textbooks  
There are several useful anthologies. Watson (1982) is still very useful, while the 
extensively revised second edition (2003) compasses more recent debates referred to in 
subsequent sections of this entry. Schoeman (1987) is an important collection of 
original papers. Fischer and Ravizza (1993) reprint many influential contributions – 
often these are cited in subsequent sections of this article. Honderich (n.d.) is also  a 
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very useful on-line collection of influential papers. There is no textbook specifically on 
the topic of moral responsibility. However, Lucas (1993) and Matravers (2007) offer 
interesting, non-technical discussions touching on several different facets of 
responsibility. 
Watson, G. (ed) (1982) Free Will (Oxford University Press, Oxford) (2nd edition 2003) 
[Anthology of previously published twentieth century treatments of moral 
responsibility as well as free will – a very useful introduction. The second edition 
is much revised to include many more recent articles.] 
Schoeman, F. (ed) (1987) Responsibility, Character and the Emotions (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge) 
[A collection of original papers of very high quality.] 
Fischer, J.M. & Ravizza, M. (eds) (1993) Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Cornell 
University Press) 
[An anthology that reprints many influential papers, from Strawson’s ‘Freedom 
and Resentment’ onwards.] 
Honderich, T. (ed) (n.d.) The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website, 
[www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwIntroIndex.htm] 
[Comprehensive selection of influential articles, mainly from the last few decades 
but including a few extracts from classic texts. All are freely available on-line.]   
Lucas, F.R. (1993) Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford) 
[Not strictly an overview nor a textbook, but succinctly treats many different 
aspects of responsibility, some of which are generally overlooked in 
contemporary discussions.] 
Matravers, M. (2007) Responsibility and Justice (Polity, Cambridge) 
[Begins with a thorough but accessible discussion of contemporary theoretical 
debates regarding moral responsibility. Though compatibilist in approach, 
Matravers argues that compatibilists tend to be too sanguine that all aspects of our 
practices of responsibility can be justified. Investigates both questions of 
responsibility in distributive justice (the debate about what has come to be called 
‘luck egalitarianism’) and retributive justice (punishment).] 
Free Will 
As most readers will know, moral responsibility has often been discussed in connection 
with the question of free will. This generates the debate between incompatibilists (who 
believe that responsibility depends on a notion of freedom incompatible with natural 
causality, whether or not such freedom may actually exist) and compatibilists (who 
think moral responsibility is compatible with a naturalistic understanding of the world). 
A future entry will be devoted specifically to the topic of free will, so this section gives 
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only a few introductory pointers. Strawson (1994) provides a useful recent statement of 
a key argument for incompatibilism. Kane (2002) offers an advanced, authoritative 
overview of analytic approaches. Vihvelin (2003), Clarke (2000) and O’Connor (2002) 
are readily available and reliable encyclopedia entries. Finally, Levy and McKenna 
(2008) provide an up-to-date overview that requires familiarity with earlier debates. 
Strawson, G., (1994) ‘The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,’ Philosophical 
Studies, 75, 5-24 
[Trenchant restatement of the idea that moral responsibility depends on a notion 
of free will that is unavailable given our naturalistic worldview.] 
Kane, R. (ed) (2002) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford University Press, New 
York) 
[A thorough, advanced collection of overview articles by some of the most 
influential contemporary authors. It largely focuses on incompatibilist approaches 
but also includes a number of useful articles covering compatibilist contributions.] 
Vihvelin, K. (2003/7) ‘Arguments for Incompatibilism’ Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy [plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments] 
[First of three Stanford entries, that together provide a comprehensive guide to the 
literature. This entry surveys the motivations for adopting an incompatibilist view. 
As well as arguments based on intuition, it may be argued that determinism 
prevents us from controlling our actions in the right sort of way for moral 
responsibility, or that determinism deprives us of the ability to do otherwise (this 
being, so it is held, essential to moral responsibility).]  
Clarke, R. (2000/8) ‘Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will’ Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy [plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories] 
[This article surveys the three principal forms that incompatibilist accounts may 
take so far as the causation of actions is concerned: those that hinge on an absence 
of causality, those that trace responsibility back to an uncaused event, and those 
that invoke a specific sort of ‘agent-causation.’] 
O’Connor, T. (2002/5) ‘Free Will’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
[plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill] 
[This article considers the variety of things that philosophers have meant in 
speaking of free will: that we have the power to choose rationally, that we own 
our choices and actions (see *Identifying with our Actions*), or that we cause or 
control our actions. It also surveys some theological questions that originally 
prompted concerns about free will and responsibility.] 
Levy, N. & McKenna, M. (2008) ‘Recent Work on Free Will and Moral 
Responsibility,’ Philosophy Compass 4:1, 96-133 
[Thorough, technical overview of debates within the last decade.] 
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Classic Texts 
This entry focuses mainly on contemporary approaches to moral responsibility and their 
immediate precursors, but many authors in the history of philosophy have addressed this 
topic. Setting aside discussions animated by theological concerns – such as problems 
posed by divine foreknowledge of how we will act – the most important contributions 
are arguably those of Aristotle, Hume and Kant. Aristotle’s discussion of excusing 
conditions in the Nicomachean Ethics [2000] is justly famous. Broadie (1991) and 
Meyer (1993) show how this brief analysis connects with Aristotle’s wider theory of 
moral agency. Hume’s moral theory [1748/51] is explicitly based in the qualities of 
character that elicit our esteem and reproach, and is an important inspiration for 
Strawson’s influential account (see *Responsibility and the Reactive Sentiments*). 
Russell (1995) shows the sophistication of Hume’s account and its place in his wider 
moral theory. Kant is often taken as the father of modern incompatibilist views about 
responsibility, because his view of moral obligation and moral character rests on the 
‘noumenal’ freedom of the rational agent – a freedom that can never be known from our 
sensory or scientific experience of the world. Kant’s account is deep and controversial, 
however, and he hardly discusses responsibility except in legal terms. His characteristic 
concern, explored at most depth in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 
[1998], is with how we should each regard all our actions as imputable to us, as 
reflecting an underlying and freely chosen moral disposition; but it is not clear that this 
provides any straightforward rationale for practices of blame and responsibility. 
Korsgaard (1996) draws on Kant’s views to explore these practices and suggests that he 
may even be read in a broadly compatibilist fashion. Hill (2002) discusses Kant’s 
account of punishment and shows that it does not invoke the metaphysics of free will. 
(See also Ripstein (1999) and Ripstein (2004), *The Value of Choice and Contractualist 
Developments*.) 
Aristotle [2000], Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Crisp (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge) 
[Book III §§1-5 investigate the conditions where blame is appropriate and the 
extent to which factors such as coercion, force of circumstances, and factual 
ignorance might excuse. As Broadie (1991) and Meyer (1993) show, however, 
these sections need to be read against Aristotle’s broader picture of moral 
agency.] 
Broadie, S. (1991) Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford University Press, New York) 
[In Ch. 3, ‘The Voluntary,’ Broadie argues that is it is a mistake to read Aristotle 
as concerned with questions of determinism. His concern is with the distinctive 
power of adult human beings to act in accordance with virtue. To develop this 
power and guard against its corruption, we must recognise and judge vicious 
persons and less than virtuous conduct, as well as their opposites.] 
Meyer, S.S. (1993) Aristotle on Moral Responsibility: Character and Cause (Blackwell, 
Oxford) 
[Subtle analysis of Aristotle’s account of moral agency. Argues that Aristotle’s 
account does not invoke – as some readers of NE III.5 have thought – a 
responsibility for character that would be at odds with his emphasis on training 
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and habituation. Rather, it rests on the view that only moral agents can be the non-
accidental, efficient causes of morally significant outcomes.] 
Hume, D. [1748/51] Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the 
Principles of Morals (various editions) 
[In the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ‘On Liberty and Necessity’ 
emphasises the regularity of human conduct, and that qualities of character are 
ascribed – whether in blame or praise – on the basis of this stability. The final 
Appendix to the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, ‘Of some verbal 
disputes,’ rejects any clear line between the virtues, if they are understood as 
voluntary, and the talents: both are objects of praise, while their opposites attract 
censure and disapproval.] 
Russell, P. (1995) Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume’s Way of Naturalizing 
Responsibility (Oxford University Press, New York) 
[Shows that Hume’s view is more sophisticated than the ‘classic’ compatibilist 
view, that uncoerced action is free while compelled action – as opposed to action 
underlain by causal forces in general – is unfree. For Hume, our moral sentiments 
respond to qualities of character evinced by actions; it is qualities of character, 
rather than any liberty of the will, that underlie practices of responsibility.] 
Kant, I. [1998] Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. Allen Wood  & 
George Di Giovanni (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 
[Book I offers Kant’s most extended discussion of our propensity to subordinate 
morality to inclination (if not in action then at the level of motivation), and why 
we must regard this propensity as imputable to us: ‘For if the moral law 
commands that we ought to be better human beings now, it inescapably follows 
that we must be capable of being better human beings’ (p. 94, 6:50).] 
Korsgaard, C. (1996) ‘Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in 
Personal Relations’ in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge)  
[A sophisticated Kantian account of responsibility that goes beyond Kant’s own 
concern with self-imputation. Argues that responsibility pertains not to 
‘theoretical’ facts – about abilities to do otherwise, say – but rather to the practical 
perspective that we must take in interacting with others as free and equal rational 
agents.] 
Hill, T.E. Jr. (2002) ‘Wrong-doing, Desert and Punishment’ in his Human Welfare and 
Moral Worth (Oxford University Press, New York) 
[Shows that Kant’s account of punishment is not the retributivist account often 
attributed to him. In particular, Kant’s account is not based on the moral deserts of 
the free will, but rather on the need for a coercive authority to uphold people’s 
rights to a freedom of action that is compatible with like freedom for all.] 
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Contemporary Debates and their Precursors 
The following four sub-sections are based on four of the most influential articles that 
continue to act as focal points in present debates. These are: (I) Jack Smart’s utilitarian 
account of ‘Free Will, Praise, and Blame; (II) Peter Strawson’s ‘Freedom and 
Resentment’; (III) Harry Frankfurt’s ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’; 
and (IV) H.L.A. Hart’s ‘Legal Responsibility and Excuses.’ Although there are 
important points of contact between the lines of thought set out in each of the original 
articles referred to, each makes a distinctive point and has inspired a distinctive set of 
contributions up to the present day. These four approaches do not exhaust the field, 
even within analytic moral philosophy, and the two following sections point to further 
sets of issues that have emerged, or combine concerns raised by the four approaches set 
out here. While the first-mentioned, the utilitarian approach, is now less discussed, it 
would be fair to say that all of the other topics continue to attract intense debate. That 
said, the basic suggestion that issues from these approaches when taken together – that a 
compatibilist account of moral responsibility should be based in people’s capacity to 
appreciate moral considerations and to exchange moral reasons – may be considered a 
matter of consensus. 
(I) Utilitarian Instrumentalism 
The utilitarian position – often referred to as an ‘economy of threats’ – remains the 
position that contemporary moral philosophers love to hate. Smart (1961) offers an 
especially clear and succinct utilitarian account of praise and blame; his is also a very 
clear example of an instrumentalist approach to responsibility attribution: praise and 
blame are tools that we use in order to encourage persons to make greater contributions 
to overall utility. Dennett (1984) is a refreshingly brusque confrontation with many 
intuitions that seem to support incompatibilism, and also sketches a basically utilitarian 
account of moral responsibility. While most writers on responsibility now reject – 
largely following Strawson, 1962 (see *Responsibility and the Reactive Sentiments*) – 
the idea that practices of responsibility are essentially instruments to secure social 
benefits, Arneson (2003) is important in revisiting Smart’s contribution to suggest that it 
makes a point of enduring value. 
Smart, J.J.C. (1961) ‘Free Will, Praise, and Blame,’ Mind 70, 291-306 
[Contends that praise and blame are about (i) ‘grading’ people and their 
contributions, and (ii) influencing them to do better.] 
Dennett, D. (1984) Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford) 
[Sprightly run-through the ‘bugbears’ that, as Dennett holds, illicitly support 
intuitions about free will. Offers a broadly rule-utilitarian account of 
responsibility: we maintain practices of responsibility in order to support 
ourselves and one another in acting well.] 
Arneson, R. (2003) ‘The Smart Theory Of Moral Responsibility And Desert’ in Desert 
and Justice, ed. Serena Olsaretti (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 
Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy – ‘Moral Responsibility’ Garrath Williams 
MS8 Moral Responsibility final [eprints version].doc 8 
[While critical of Smart, Arneson points out that his account gets something 
important quite right: practices of responsibility involve our exercising influence 
on one another in the cause of better conduct and outcomes.] 
(II) Responsibility and the Reactive Sentiments 
Peter Strawson’s famous essay ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (1962) resituated the free 
will debate by highlighting the importance of ‘reactive attitudes’ such as resentment or 
gratitude to ‘ordinary inter-personal relationships.’ Against the free will-ists’ resort to 
‘panicky metaphysics,’ Strawson urges that the ways in which we divide responsible 
persons and actions from non-responsible agents and behaviours do not depend on 
anything so mysterious as an absence of causal determination, but rather on whether we 
are engaged in normal interpersonal relations – marked by such activities as quarrelling, 
loving, reasoning and much else besides. Affective responses like resentment and 
gratitude mark those relations, as they do not our relations with animals or the insane. 
(As Strawson observes, our relations with children occupy a crucial in-between place.) 
Against utilitarians like Smart, Strawson points out that affective responses and 
practices of responsibility would not work in the way they do, if we saw them as mere 
tools of enforcement or encouragement. To respond to agents in such a calculating way 
would mark an ‘objective’ attitude, as opposed to seeing the person as a fellow ‘member 
of the moral community.’ Strawson concludes, ‘these practices [of reaction and 
responsibility], and their reception, the reactions to them [such as remorse], really are 
expressions of our moral attitudes and not merely devices we calculatingly employ for 
regulative purposes.’ Pincoffs (1988) and Murphy and Hampton (1988) develop parallel 
lines of thought without obvious debt to Strawson. Watson (1987) and Russell (1992) 
are two of many illuminating responses to Strawson, and others are collected in 
McKenna (2007). Wallace (1994) is the most well-known and systematic development 
of Strawson, and is also important among the approaches which are grouped together 
under *Moral Reasons and Moral Address*. 
Strawson, P.F. (1962) ‘Freedom and Resentment,’ Proceedings of the British Academy 
48, 1-25 (Variously reprinted including Watson, 1982/2003; Fischer & Ravizza, 1993; 
Honderich, n.d. – see *Anthologies and Textbooks*) 
[The single most influential essay in the literature on moral responsibility. Can be 
read as a direct response to the utilitarian instrumentalism of Smart (1961) and 
others. Practices of responsibility are not tools by which we manipulate others; 
they are part of what it is to relate to others as members of a moral community.] 
Pincoffs, E. (1988) ‘The Practices of Responsibility-Ascription,’ Proceedings and 
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 61:5, 823-839  
[Thoughtful but little-noticed essay that follows Strawson in emphasising that 
practices of responsibility are a mode of responding to the infliction of harm. If 
we were to reject those practices – say because of philosophical doubts about 
responsibility – we would be bound to settle on some alternative set of practices to 
deal with harms caused: but there seem to be no plausible alternatives.] 
Murphy, J. & Hampton, J. (1988) Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge) 
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[Thoughtful exchange of views particularly concerned with our feelings of anger 
and resentment in response to wrong-doing, the reasons that should lead us to 
forgive, and where it may be appropriate to endorse retributive feelings. (Not a 
response to Strawson as such.)] 
Watson, G. (1987) ‘Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian 
Theme’ in Schoeman (ed) (1987), reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza (eds) (1993) and G. 
Watson, Agency and answerability: selected essays (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2004) 
[Asks whether, and why, some persons might be exempted from the Strawsonian 
moral community. Uses a particularly horrible, real-life example of a wrong-doer: 
given his abusive up-bringing, was he in a position to appreciate the wrongness of 
the murders he committed? Influentially concludes that ‘the boundaries of moral 
responsibility are the boundaries of intelligible moral address.’] 
Russell, P. (1992) ‘Strawson’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility,’ Ethics 102, 287-
302 
[Criticises Strawson for arguing that the reactive sentiments are part of our 
‘nature,’ and therefore do not require justification or permit reasoning about 
whether they are called for.] 
McKenna, M. & Russell, P. (eds) (2007) Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives 
on P.F. Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (Ashgate, Aldershot) 
[Anthology reprinting important papers responding to Strawson. Includes Watson 
(1987), Russell (1992), an extract from Wallace (1994), as well as essays by 
Susan Wolf, Galen Strawson and others.] 
Wallace, R J (1994) Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA)  
[Highly regarded study indebted to Strawson. Asks when it is fair to hold 
someone responsible and thus expose them to “reactive” emotions or various 
penalties. Suggests that this is fair where the person has actually done wrong (ie, 
his conduct is not excused) and where person has ability to respond to moral 
reasons (the lack of which, claims Wallace, exempts a person from 
responsibility).] 
 (III) Identifying with our Actions 
Several essays of Harry Frankfurt’s have been highly influential in discussions of the 
agency of responsible persons, although Frankfurt says relatively little about 
responsibility as such. While utilitarians emphasise social benefits and Strawson draws 
our attention to interpersonal relations, Frankfurt characteristically (Frankfurt 1969, 
Frankfurt 1971, Frankfurt 1987) emphasises aspects of self-hood. One surprising 
omission from Frankfurt’s work and most subsequent commentary on him is the 
question of the standards by which a person should govern her choices or desires: Susan 
Wolf’s contribution (1987) is important in observing this aspect. Schroeder and Arpaly 
(1999) suggest we should not necessarily look for the authoritative and responsible self 
in a person’s most self-conscious beliefs about what she should do – just as important, if 
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not more so, are our habits and dispositions to respond to others. This point is also taken 
up by many of the accounts concerned with what should be attributed to a person, as 
discussed in the section, *Arguments Against Control*. Buss and Overton (2002) is a 
major collection of original papers on Frankfurt’s work, many of which take up his 
concerns with the structure of the self and responsible agency. 
Frankfurt, H. (1971) ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’ Journal of 
Philosophy 68, 5-20 (Reprinted in Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About: 
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988) and Watson (ed), 
1982 – see *Anthologies and Textbooks*) 
[Suggests that the will is free when we are able to endorse – will, or identify with 
– our everyday, first order volitions. Someone who is subject to a compelling 
addiction is free insofar as she endorses her will to take the drug, and – claims 
Frankfurt – also responsible, even though she is, at another level, compelled to 
take the drug.] 
Frankfurt, H. (1969) ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,’ Journal of 
Philosophy 66, 828-839 (Reprinted in Frankfurt, 1988) 
[Trails the idea that a person might be fated to perform a particular act (ie, there 
are no ‘alternate possibilities’) and yet nonetheless wills to do so – and is 
accordingly responsible, even in the absence of ‘an ability to do otherwise.’ Much 
discussed in subsequent debates about free will.] 
Frankfurt, H. (1987) ‘Identification and Wholeheartedness’ in Schoeman, ed. (1987) 
(see *Anthologies and Textbooks*) (Reprinted in Frankfurt’s Necessity, Volition, and 
Love (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999) and in Fischer (ed) 1993 – see 
*Anthologies and Textbooks*) 
[One of several later essays where Frankfurt develops the notion of identification. 
Here Frankfurt emphasises that a higher-order process of considering and 
rejecting values can lead to a wholehearted identification with them. So a person 
‘makes up her mind,’ and thereby takes responsibility for it. Says little concerning 
implications for our holding persons responsible, however.] 
Wolf, S. (1987) ‘Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility’ in Schoeman, ed. (1987) 
[Points out that a person may wholeheartedly identify with quite evil first order 
desires, perhaps owing to a perverted upbringing – to the point where we would 
not consider him responsible. Argues that a responsible agent needs to be morally 
‘sane’ – that is, able to know right from wrong, and hence to evaluate her 
character (or first order desires) in a reasonable way.] 
Arpaly, N. & Schroeder, T. (1999) ‘Praise, Blame and the Whole Self,’ Philosophical 
Studies 93: 161–188 
[Points out that we may fail to endorse, as a matter of explicit belief, our good 
actions (‘inverse akrasia’). Against Frankfurt’s account, which seems to imply 
that this removes praiseworthiness or even responsibility, the authors suggest an 
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‘integrated self’ account of responsibility, which suggests that we are responsible 
for all actions that more-or-less reflect our character.] 
Buss, S. & Overton, L. (eds) (2002) Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry 
Frankfurt (MIT Press, Cambridge MA)  
[Important collection of essays on Frankfurt with replies by Frankfurt himself. 
Many essays bear on the hierarchical model of the self and its relation to questions 
of responsibility, including those by Susan Wolf, Richard Moran, T.M. Scanlon, 
David Velleman, Gary Watson, J.M. Fischer, and Eleanor Stump.] 
(IV) The Value of Choice and Contractualist Developments 
H.L.A. Hart’s (1968) more-or-less rule-utilitarian account of excusing conditions in the 
law has been influential to contractualist accounts of responsibility, especially T.M. 
Scanlon’s. Hart himself strongly distinguishes between moral and legal responsibility, 
but it is obvious that a similar analysis might be offered in the moral case: We excuse a 
person who lacked the ability to conform to a moral norm, because morality is a system 
of requirements that is intimately related to our capacities to voluntarily govern our 
conduct. Scanlon (1998) develops this thought: in different ways, blame and 
punishment uphold moral standards, while upholding the value of our capacities of 
choice; Wallace (2002) and Williams (2006) respond. Lenman (2006) offers a slightly 
different take on the contractualist idea that practices of responsibility belong to 
reasonable terms of cooperation. Ripstein (1999) and Ripstein (2004) explicitly 
considers legal responsibility but should also be read as contributions to a wider 
political theory of responsibility (albeit one that is properly described as Kantian rather 
than contractualist).  
Hart, H.L.A. (1968) ‘Legal Responsibility and Excuses’ in his Punishment and 
Responsibility (Oxford University Press, New York) 
[Hart points out that law is meant to regulate people’s conduct by acting on their 
capacities of choice. Where a person lacks the ability to meaningfully choose – as 
in cases of insanity or duress, for example – it therefore makes no sense to apply 
the same legal penalties.  
Hart, H.L.A. (1968) ‘Postscript: Responsibility and Retribution’ in his Punishment and 
Responsibility  
[Still useful as a discussion of the many different ways in which the words 
‘responsible’ and ‘responsibility’ are used.] 
Scanlon, T.M. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other, ch. 6 (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge MA) 
[Attacks a simple account of retrospective responsibility in terms of choice (“the 
forfeiture view”), for a more sophisticated “value of choice” view. We hold 
people responsible, not because they deserve whatever foreseeably accrues to 
them from their choices, but because people’s capacity for choice is so important. 
But choice is only meaningful within a more or less predictable framework of 
consequences and responses.] 
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Wallace, R.J. (2002) ‘Scanlon’s Contractualism,’ Ethics 112, 429-470 – plus response 
by Scanlon in the same issue at 510-513 
[Interesting critique of Scanlon by the author of one of the most influential books 
in the field. Of especial interest is the weight Wallace puts on a person’s capacity 
to respond to moral reasons, if she is properly to be considered responsible. By 
contrast, Scanlon emphasises the authority of moral requirements, even if a 
person’s vices seem quite fixed.] 
Williams, A. (2006) ‘Liberty, Liability, and Contractualism,’ in N. Holtug and K. 
Lippert  Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of  
Equality (Oxford University Press, Oxford)  
[Critical discussion of Scanlon’s account in What We Owe to Each Other.] 
Lenman, J. (2006) ‘Compatibilism and Contractualism: The Possibility of Moral 
Responsibility,’ Ethics 117, 7-31 
[Suggests that moral responsibility represents a good contractualist bet. Imagining 
that one did not know what sort of moral character one would have, what sort of 
social arrangements would one choose? Given that human beings have some 
ability to live up to moral norms, argues Lenman, arrangements based on practices 
of responsibility would be a fair bet.] 
Ripstein, A. (1999) Equality, Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge) 
[Important recent legal and political discussion. Disavows the “voluntarism” (the 
focus on individual capacities underlying responsible agency and the fairness of 
retrospective responsibility) of many moral and legal accounts of responsibility, 
by suggesting that practices of responsibility are intrinsic to maintaining fair terms 
of interaction.] 
Ripstein, A. (2004) ‘Justice and Responsibility,’ Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence XVII:2, 361-386 
[Focussing on the law but again in the light of a wider political account. Important 
in developing the author’s ‘reciprocity conception of responsibility, which 
supposes that responsibility must be understood in terms of norms governing what 
people are entitled to expect of each other.’] 
Moral Reasons and Moral Address 
As noted under *Identifying with our Actions*, Frankfurt-style approaches do not tend 
to consider the question of what standards a responsible agent should follow, while the 
utilitarian picture tends to suggest applying social pressure rather than the exchange of 
reasons. By contrast, Strawsonians and contractualists emphasise how responsible 
persons to respond to one another and to right reason. This section points to a group of 
approaches that relate to a prominent idea in RJ Wallace’s (1994) account: that it is fair 
to hold a person responsible to the extent that she has the ability to respond to moral 
reasons (see *Responsibility and the Reactive Sentiments*). Wolf (1990) is an equally 
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important statement of this idea. (See also Korsgaard (1996) under *Classic Texts* for a 
sophisticated Kantian statement of an allied view.) Darwall (2006) offers a recognisably 
Kantian account, developed more systematically as a theory of morality. These authors 
all emphasise that practices of responsibility involve addressing the wrong-doer with 
moral reasons. Watson (1987) is often cited as coining the term ‘moral address,’ and the 
term is made more explicit in McKenna (1998); Hampton (1984) already suggested a 
similar idea with regard to punishment. Fischer and Ravizza (1998) is an influential 
work that also stresses the moral competence of the responsible person, although 
practices of moral address and mutual accountability play little role in their account. 
Like Frankfurt, they are concerned with individual agency; Watson (2001) accordingly 
criticises their subjective notion of ‘taking responsibility.’ 
Wolf, S. (1990) Freedom within Reason (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 
[Attacks Frankfurt-style ‘Real Self’ views and free will based ‘Autonomy’ views 
in favour of a ‘Reason’ view. The virtuous person who cannot act badly is 
responsible; the mad, stunted or brainwashed person who cannot act well is not; 
the rest of us, who are less than fully virtuous, may be nonetheless ‘normatively 
competent,’ hence responsible for our deeds.] 
Darwall, S. (2006) The Second-Person Standpoint (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge MA) 
[Account of morality based on each person’s authority to address others – ‘second 
persons’ – with moral claims. Accountability is therefore basic to ethics: the 
standing to address claims is coeval with the authority to press claims when these 
have been breached. Argues that this presupposes a shared competence to 
determine and act on moral reasons.] 
Watson, G. (1987) ‘Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian 
Theme’ in Schoeman (ed) (1987) (see *Anthologies and Textbooks*) (Reprinted in 
Fischer and Ravizza (eds) (1993) and G. Watson, Agency and Answerability: Selected 
Essays (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004)) 
[Influential response to Strawson 1962 (see *Responsibility and the Reactive 
Sentiments*) that argues that ‘the boundaries of moral responsibility are the 
boundaries of intelligible moral address.’] 
McKenna, M.S. (1998) ‘The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A Defense 
of Strawsonian Compatibilism,’ The Journal of Ethics 2, 123–142 
[Discusses and supplements the relation between Strawson 1962 (see 
*Responsibility and the Reactive Sentiments*) and Watson (1987), focussing on 
the role of moral address in practices of responsibility.] 
Hampton, J. (1984) ‘The Moral Education Theory of Punishment,’ Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 13:3, 208-238 
[State punishment expresses the public view of what ought to be prohibited, and 
educates anyone who does not yet appreciate this: ‘Wrong occasions punishment 
not because pain deserves pain, but because evil deserves correction.’ Related 
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views may be found in Feinberg (1970), Fingarette (1967), Fingarette (2004), (see 
*Early Contributions*) and Hampton & Murphy (1988) (see *Responsibility and 
the Reactive Sentiments*).] 
Fischer, J.M. & Ravizza, M. (1998) Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral 
Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press) 
[Argues that responsibility relates to ‘guidance control’ over one’s actions, which 
rests on (i) moderate responsiveness to reasons and (ii) taking responsibility for 
one’s capacity to control one’s actions.] 
Watson, G. (2001) ‘Reasons and Responsibility,’ Ethics 111:1, 374-94, reprinted in 
Watson (2004) 
[Critical response to Fischer and Ravizza (1998), focusing on the notion of ‘taking 
responsibility.’] 
Arguments Against Control 
Many discussions of moral responsibility assume that we can specify what someone is 
responsible for in terms of what was under her control. This idea clearly relates to an 
important truth, but Merrihew-Adams (1985), and a number of more recent articles, 
have offered devastating objections to any simple claim that we are only responsible for 
what was under our control. This issue arises from at least two directions. First, the 
emphasis on control has often motivated incompatibilist intuitions. Sher (2005) points 
out that the control-condition is more often assumed than argued for; his 2006a argues 
that it conflicts with a surprisingly wide range of cases where we would normally 
consider a person responsible. Second, questions about control arise in connection with 
the approaches mentioned in the last section, that emphasise the responsible person’s 
responsiveness to moral reasons. What should we say of the responsibility of the 
thoroughly selfish or obdurate person, whose vices seem so settled that it seems false to 
say that she can respond to a certain class of moral considerations? It would be odd to 
think that such a person were thereby exempted from blame, or that we should relate to 
her just as we do to someone who exhibits the opposing virtues. Sher (2006b) examines 
and modifies the Humean view, that we judge a person’s actions insofar as they reflect 
settled character traits. Smith (2005) and Scanlon (2008) develop parallel points. Such 
arguments are sometimes referred to as ‘attributionist’ because they suggest that many 
wrongful acts – be they chosen or spontaneous, non-deliberate or acts of omission – 
reveal flaws in a person’s moral commitments. These actions and flaws are then 
attributed to the person, even if she seems unable to appreciate that they are morally 
faulty or to alter her conduct for the better. 
Merrihew-Adams, R. (1985) ‘Involuntary Sins,’ Philosophical Review 94:1, 3-31 
[Argues that we can be responsible for states of mind such as jealousy, hatred or 
ingratitude, and that these cannot, in many cases, be plausibly traced to voluntary 
choices or omissions. Moreover, to overcome one’s tendencies to such states 
typically involves taking responsibility for them.] 
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Sher, G. (2005) ‘Kantian Fairness,’ Philosophical Issues (Nous annual supplement) 15, 
179-192 
[Observes how little argument has been offered for the ‘Kantian principle’ that it 
is unfair to hold people responsible for acts/omissions over which they lack 
control. Argues that we necessarily hold people responsible from a perspective 
that is not the actor’s own; our blame may therefore express moral demands that 
the actor fails to appreciate.]  
Sher, G. (2006a) ‘Out of Control,’ Ethics 116, 285-301 
[Points out how often we hold people responsible for actions even though they 
could not help performing them: eg, distracted or neglectful omissions, panicky or 
ill-judged actions, actions based on lack of moral insight or appreciation.] 
Sher, G. (2006b) In Praise of Blame (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 
[Advocates a modified Humean account of blame (see *Classic Texts*), whereby 
actions are blameworthy insofar as they reflect stable, non-virtuous character 
traits. Sher argues that we (rightly) blame people for actions and outcomes that 
stem from ‘the interplay of the… desires, beliefs and dispositions that… make 
[the wrong-doer] the person he is.’] 
Smith, A. (2005) ‘Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,’ 
Ethics 115, 236-271 
[Argues that practices of responsibility attribution relate to ‘judgment-sensitive 
attitudes’ rather than choices as such. Thus we can be responsible for forgetful 
omissions, failures to notice morally salient facts, involuntary reactions such as 
grief (or lack of), etc. All these are revealing of our attitudes to others and our 
evaluative judgments, and hence legitimate bases of moral appraisal.] 
Scanlon, T.M. (2008) Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Belknap, 
Cambridge MA) 
[Account of blame based on the thought that, in general, we blame others within 
the context of particular relationships. To blame is to express our sense of the 
moral demands involved in that relationship, and how it has been undermined by 
some form of wrong-doing. Such practices do not ride on the idea that the wrong-
doer is necessarily able to control his wrong-doing.] 
Earlier Contributions 
This section points to a number of thoughtful contributions that do not, for the most 
part, attract attention in contemporary philosophical discussions, although some (such 
as Austin 1956-7, Feinberg 1970, Williams 1993 and Williams 1997) are often cited. 
Often this neglect owes to their failure to fit some recognised school, or perhaps to a 
less technical approach than is currently favoured. It may be, then, they can help us to 
appreciate aspects of moral responsibility that are insufficiently attended to in 
contemporary discussions. Joel Feinberg and Herbert Fingarette are both important 
philosophers who collected many of their essays into stimulating collections (Feinberg, 
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1970; Fingarette 1967, 2004). Austin (1956-7), McKeon (1957) and Ricoeur (1992) are 
all revealing essays by important philosophers who otherwise did not write on 
responsibility as such. Bernard Williams often criticised the modern concern with 
voluntariness and choice (cf *Arguments Against Control* above): two of his most 
explicit treatments of responsibility are Williams (1993) and Williams (1997), the 
former being in part a response to Adkins (1960). 
Feinberg, J. (1970) Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press) 
[A set of classic essays on action and responsibility, often inflected by legal 
concerns but usually with an eye to moral responsibility too.] 
Fingarette, H. (1967) On Responsibility (New York: Basic Books)  
[A set of classic essays. ‘Acceptance of Responsibility’ anticipates many later 
discussions, such as Susan Wolf’s, by taking the example of psychopathy and 
argues that responsibility attributions are intelligible only insofar as they connect 
up with a person’s existing moral concern.] 
Fingarette, H. (2004) Mapping Responsibility (Open Court, Chicago)  
[A collection of beautifully succinct essays, summarising a lifetime’s careful 
reflection on many aspects of responsibility.] 
Austin, J.L. (1956-7) ‘A Plea for Excuses,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57, 
1-30 
[A set of stimulating provocations rather than a theory or account of excuse. 
Probes the concept of action and how actions may go wrong through our ways of 
talking about this. (Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, J.O. Urmson & G.J. 
Warnock, eds. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.)]  
McKeon, R. (1957) ‘The Development and the Significance of the Concept of 
Responsibility,’ Revue Internationale de Philosophie, XI, no. 39, 3-32 
[A historical study of the concept, stressing that the original motivations for 
taking up responsibility as a topic of theoretical analysis were practical and 
political – in particular, to avoid controverted questions of metaphysics and moral 
psychology. Considers JS Mill and Max Weber, among others.] 
Ricoeur, P. (1992) ‘The Concept of Responsibility: An Essay in Semantic Analysis’ in 
his The Just, trans. D. Pellauer (University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 
[Demanding and rich essay. Analyses the concept both in relation to the 
fundamentals of human agency and in relation to contemporary concerns with 
risk, indemnification, and – following Jonas (1984) (see *Social and Political 
Approaches*) – responsibility to future generations.] 
Williams, B. (1993) Shame and Necessity (University of California Press, Los Angeles) 
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[Argues that the ancient Greeks had a sophisticated account of responsibility 
attribution, which avoided the mistaken emphasis on voluntariness Williams finds 
in modern morality, or at any rate, in philosophical interpretations of this. 
Contends that there may be different valid conceptions of responsibility in 
different contexts, but all combine four elements: cause [of action or outcome], 
intention [of the actor], state [of the actor’ mind] and response [which we deem 
morally required of the actor].] 
Williams, B. (1997) ‘Moral Responsibility and Political Freedom,’ Cambridge Law 
Journal 56: 96-102, reprinted in his Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline (ed. A.W. 
Moore, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2008: 119-25) 
[A succinct statement of Williams’ view that (i) responsibility rests on the four 
elements specified in Shame and Necessity, (ii) political freedom rests on the 
state’s punishing only voluntary acts, and (iii) the idea of ‘voluntariness’ should 
not be regarded as metaphysically ‘deep.’ The edition of the journal also includes 
a reply by Antony Duff and Andrew von Hirsch.] 
Adkins, A.W.H. (1960) Merit and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford) 
[Argues that the Greeks lacked modern, Kantian notions of duty and fairness in 
assigning responsibility. Important largely as a foil for Williams (1993).] 
Social and Political Approaches 
The social and political ramifications of responsibility are enormous, and not often 
hinted at in contemporary philosophical discussions of moral responsibility. The 
following represent some exceptions to this tendency, in addition to those included in 
the previous section. Barnes (2000) stands apart as a contribution from sociological 
theory, while the others – for all their diversity – pose political questions about divisions 
and attributions of responsibility that are neglected when one focuses on the agency of 
individual persons, or frames matters in terms of ‘moral reasons’ in the abstract. Jonas 
(1984) underlines modern human beings’ collective responsibility with regard to the 
existence of future generations, and the responsibility of the ‘statesman,’ but does not 
consider the division of responsibilities between individuals. Vickers (1973), Vickers 
(1980), Williams (2006), and Williams (2008) are concerned with the institutional 
conditions needed for responsible conduct: how persons may obtain a concrete sense of 
the ‘reasons’ they should act on, and how they should hold one another accountable. 
Smiley (1992) highlights questions of power and belonging, while Bovens (1998) 
considers how individuals ought to be held accountable when organisations act badly, 
and how responsible conduct and responsible organisations can be encouraged.  
Barnes, B. (2000) Understanding Agency: Social Theory and Responsible Action (Sage, 
London) 
[Barnes’ sociological background and frank relativism will deter most 
philosophers, but those who persist will find a wealth of insight and argument. 
Barnes’ central thought is that to consider a person as ‘responsible’ is to accord a 
social status, that corresponds to effective rights to participate in social life.] 
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Jonas, H. (1984) The Imperative of Responsibility (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago) 
[Argues that modern humankind’s new power to destroy nature creates a 
historically novel responsibility toward future generations.] 
Vickers G. (1973) Making Institutions Work (Associated Business Programmes, 
London) 
[Vickers’ work fitted no recognised discipline, let alone any recognised school of 
philosophy. The essays in this book, and in the following entry, are an important 
contribution to understanding modern institutional structures, and in particular the 
contributions and qualities – the responsibilities and sense of responsibility – that 
they demand of their members.] 
Vickers, G. (1980) Responsibility: Its Sources and its Limits (Intersystems, Seaside CA) 
[A set of essays that are effectively a companion volume to the previous entry.] 
Williams, G.  (2006) ‘“Infrastructures of Responsibility”: The Moral Tasks of 
Institutions,’ Journal of Applied Philosophy, 23:2, 207-221 
[This and the following article consider why responsibility is such an important 
quantity in liberal societies. This article argues that it is related to the ways in 
which modern societies systematically – though often faultily – divide 
responsibilities across persons, roles and institutions.] 
Williams, G. (2008) ‘Responsibility as a Virtue,’ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 
11:4, 455-470 
[Considers what is involved in praising someone as ‘responsible,’ relating this to 
contexts of action that at the same time impose many moral demands on us and 
enable us to fulfil these.] 
Smiley, M. (1992) Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community: Power and 
Accountability from a Pragmatic Point of View (University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 
[Argues that judgments of blame and responsibility hinge, in ways that 
philosophical discussions do not usually acknowledge, on configurations of 
power, social roles, and the boundaries of community – that is, who we are 
expected to take into consideration, or to answer to.] 
Bovens, M. (1998) The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in 
Complex Organizations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 
[Investigates how regulation, organisational reform, and different modes and 
channels of accountability can address irresponsibility on the part of institutions.] 
 
 
